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Abstract—Social Virtual Reality based Learning Environments 
(VRLEs) such as vSocial render instructional content in a three- 
dimensional immersive computer experience for training youth 
with learning impediments. There are limited prior works that 
explored attack vulnerability in VR technology, and hence there is 
a need for systematic frameworks to quantify risks corresponding 
to security, privacy, and safety (SPS) threats. The SPS threats 
can adversely impact the educational user experience and hinder 
delivery of VRLE content. In this paper, we propose a novel risk 
assessment framework that utilizes attack trees to  calculate a 
risk score for varied VRLE threats with rate and duration of 
threats as inputs. We compare the impact of a well-constructed 
attack tree with an adhoc attack tree to study the trade-offs 
between overheads in managing attack trees, and the cost of risk 
mitigation when vulnerabilities are identified. We use a vSocial 
VRLE testbed in a case study to showcase the effectiveness of our 
framework and demonstrate how a suitable attack tree formalism 
can result in a more safer, privacy-preserving and secure VRLE 
system. 
Index Terms—Social Virtual Reality, Security Risk Assessment, 
Attack Tree, Privacy Control, IoT Application Testbed 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ensuring human safety along with relevant security and 
privacy mechanisms are major challenges in emerging Vir- 
tual Reality based Learning Environments (VRLEs) such as 
vSocial [1] for youth with learning disabilities. In order to 
assess student engagement levels, VRLEs use emotion track- 
ing sensors whose data along with student learning progress 
are stored in a cloud platform. In spite of their promising 
potential as immersive instructional platforms, the real-time 
delivery of learning material poses security and privacy threats. 
This is a multi-modal system as shown in Fig. 1, which is built 
upon rendering 3-dimensional visualizations based on dynamic 
human computer interactions. All these components increase 
the attack surface area and negligence to address threats may 
result in negative impacts such as alteration of instructional 
content, compromise of learning outcomes or granting users 
unnecessary “false strike” penalties. This in turn may result in 
poor student engagement in ongoing classroom sessions. 
Studies such as [2] highlight the importance of security and 
privacy issues in VR devices. However, there are few efforts in 
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Fig. 1: vSocial system showing the cloud server used for 
real-time student learning session management. 
 
 
evaluating the threat scenarios in such dynamic, complex and 
large-scale collaborative systems, thereby hindering the design 
of secured and usable VRLEs. To the best of our knowledge, 
our work is one of the first systematic studies to evaluate the 
security and privacy concerns along with the quality of human 
experience in VRLEs. The focus of our work is to categorize 
threats based on three orthogonal aspects in VR applications: 
security, privacy and safety (SPS). We define security as the 
robustness of the VR system against various attacks, privacy 
as the protection and secrecy over data sensitivity, and safety 
as the disruption in the system that compromises the user’s 
overall well-being. 
In this paper, we address above issues by  proposing  a 
“risk assessment framework” utilizing attack trees to formalize 
and evaluate internal and external vulnerabilities, and prior- 
itize threats based on impact. Attack trees have been used 
extensively in threat modeling, and for understanding intru- 
sion/attack scenarios by their quantitative analysis. We apply 
the concept of attack trees to VRLEs to study how particular 
events can functionally harm specific SPS factors using a 
hierarchical visual representation of potential vulnerabilities 
and threats. With the outputs  of  attack  trees,  we  quantify 
the risk score for each SPS factor using frequency rates and 
duration of threats as parameters. 
We use the vSocial [1] system, a VRLE for youth with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), as a case study to demon- 
strate the effectiveness of our framework. We introduce three 
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sample attack scenarios that cover various SPS aspects such  
as malicious network discrepancies, packet loss, and packet 
sniffing to measure the impact of SPS threats on VRLE appli- 
cations. We use the measures from these simulations as inputs 
for attack tree nodes to demonstrate the difference in efficiency 
of a complete/well-constructed and incomplete/adhoc attack 
tree. Corresponding risk score analyses provide insights about 
system component vulnerabilities, which influence the VRLE 
policy management for threat mitigation. 
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as 
follows: 
(1) Risk assessment with a comprehensive threat model for 
VRLEs that includes threats to system robustness, user infor- 
mation and well-being. 
(2) SPS attack trees to highlight the inter-relationship of threats 
and the corresponding system component(s), which ultimately 
affects the risk score. 
(3) Trade-off analysis between attack tree qualities to obtain 
insights for component vulnerability to inform VRLE design. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec- 
tion II discusses related works on VRLE, as well as threats 
to security, privacy and safety in Internet-of-Things (IoT) 
devices. Section III formally states the SPS problem using 
threat formalization and risk assessment. Section IV presents 
performance evaluation results of our risk assessment frame- 
work. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Virtual Reality Learning Environments 
Prior works on VRLEs have been developed for immersive 
and special education purposes. In vSocial [1], a Social 
Competence Intervention (SCI) curriculum [3] is delivered via 
a system that consists of various modules such as: VR render- 
ing, web applications and classroom portal with instructional 
content hosted as web pages. The vSocial server provides 
functionalities such as access control for users, session man- 
agement, network performance tracking, session progress, and 
user management, making it a critical target in the system. 
A recent study [4] on security and privacy challenges in 
Augmented Reality (AR) and VR discusses the threat surface 
area for educational initiatives without characterizing the at- 
tack impact, however, there are very few scholarly works on 
the interplay of SPS factors from a usability perspective (i.e., 
learning experience in our use case). In VRLE, the instructor 
plays a critical role by changing the pace of curriculum 
delivery and educational VR content in the virtual classroom 
based on continuous student evaluation (e.g., tokens, passes  
or strikes). The VRLE administrator also occupies an elevated 
position as he or she controls the user data of several sessions. 
Thus, any disruption due to masquerading or spoofing by 
attacker with malicious intents [5] on the instructor’s VR con- 
tent or administrator privileges will compromise the learning 
activities in such a collaborative (virtual) space. 
The geographically distributed students setup also makes the 
system susceptible to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks as it compromises with the availability of the learning 
environment, impacts real-time data collection and student 
performance visualization. Even intermittent network discrep- 
ancy attacks can cause disruptions during sessions leading to 
cybersickness and unnecessary “false strikes.” Estimating the 
impact of these threats is complex and challenging in dynamic 
VRLEs because of the multi-modal distributed system and 
high volume of real-time data. Our work proposes a novel 
approach in addressing and evaluating the SPS threats with    
a novel risk assessment framework in context of exemplar 
VRLEs such as vSocial in a case study. 
 
 
B. Security, Privacy and Safety 
We present a summary of SPS issues in emerging tech- 
nologies such as IoT as discussed in [6], which in particular, 
comprises of an exhaustive compilation of potential security 
and privacy threats and challenges. Another comprehensive 
study about this topic is presented in [7]. A typical VRLE 
application is susceptible to similar vulnerabilities along with 
human well-being, which has not been previously addressed in 
existing works. It is important to note that we are not exploring 
the trustworthiness, but rather focusing on the effect of VR 
usability due to potential security and privacy attacks. 
Authors in [8] discuss challenges in security and privacy   
for Augmented Reality (AR) applications and explore oppor- 
tunities for securing AR systems without much discussion 
about the safety aspects. Although threats in AR and other 
IoT systems are also relevant in VR applications, VR threats 
differ from AR threats because of the complete user immersion 
in a virtual world. Multiple attacker models in [9] for threats  
in security and privacy for distributed IoT systems focus on 
threats such as DoS, physical damage, eavesdropping, etc. 
They suggest countermeasures but without evaluation studies. 
A survey in [10] classifies the security and privacy attacks in 
IoT systems, and discusses security issues in different layers 
i.e., in application, network, transport and perception. 
Previous research has examined privacy issues in AR, fog 
and mobile computing. The AR browser in [11] examines in 
depth about the vulnerabilities and requirements for mobile 
devices without any significant evaluation of proposed ap- 
proaches. Works about privacy attacks for fog computing [12] 
discuss issues such as trust and authentication, data storage, 
location and usage privacy. A thorough survey on mobile 
computing privacy threats [13] highlights the trade-off between 
functionality and privacy. Some major threats which are also 
applicable to our VRLE include: lack of transparency, tracking, 
leaks from (mobile) sensor, among others. 
A seminal work on safety issues  for  virtual  environ-  
ments [14] established that human performance efficiency is 
affected by task and user characteristics. Existing works such 
as [15], compared a virtual environment in a display monitor 
with Head-Mounted Display (HMD) to establish its correlation 
with cybersickness. Most recently, works such as [16] high- 
light the problems about overexposure and cybersickness in 
VRLEs for training youth with ASD. Considering the existing 
SPS research in such VRLE applications, our work not only 
considers security and privacy, but also safety threats in a 
single comprehensive risk assessment framework. 
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C. Risk Assessment Approaches 
Risk assessment is performed by analyzing threat param- 
eters (influence on asset, recovery cost, probability of oc- 
currence) to determine its risk priority. This can help in 
mitigating the risks and the design of defense mechanisms. 
Earlier works on attacks in cyber-physical systems in [17] 
perform a risk assessment for supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) and distributed control systems (DCSs) 
by quantitatively determining probability and impact of attack. 
This helps them perform risk reduction by designing targeted 
countermeasures. Attack tree is a hierarchical model about 
threats and respective attack scenarios. Risk assessment using 
well-constructed attack trees can prove to be a cost-effective 
approach in designing a protected system. 
Authors in [18] explain the theory and importance of attack 
trees. In a practical use case of online banking [19], the authors 
show how to use attack (and protection) trees to explain 
vulnerabilities, and develop a protection mechanism for system 
security. A work on smart cars using attack tree analysis [20] 
proposes a risk assessment framework to efficiently formulate 
the security measures. For analyzing security threats in ATMs 
[21], the authors construct attack-defense trees. Our work 
builds upon their formalization of attack trees in the context of 
SPS factors in a collaborative VRLE with realistic application 
test scenarios and VR content. 
III. THREAT FORMALIZATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
To facilitate collaboration among students distributed over 
multiple locations, social VRLE applications such  as  vSo- 
cial [1] demand continuous and secured interoperability with 
entities (e.g., network-connected edge cloud) that requires 
large-scale capture, processing, and visualization of sensor 
data streams. These inherent challenges demand novel tech- 
niques for threat modeling of SPS factors in such complex 
multi-modal systems. In our proposed work, we provide threat 
formalization and risk assessment of the virtual reality learning 
environments using vSocial as a case study. We consider the 
potential threats pertaining to the vSocial server as the critical 
attack target, along with the respective SPS factors as shown 
in Fig. 2. We use these threat-to-system component mappings 
to design our attack trees, which ultimately quantify the risk 
score for each of the VRLE application system modules. 
A. Threat Model 
A threat model is defined as a framework which details 
internal and external vulnerabilities, as well  as  objectives  
and countermeasures [22]. Threat models are utilized across 
various disciplines such as cloud computing [23], health 
records [24], and storage [25]. Threat model for a multi-modal 
system such as VRLE can provide a systematic analysis of 
possible threats and help identify any module that is highly 
vulnerable to attacks. 
Rather than exploring threats in the entire vSocial system, 
we consider the vSocial server as a critical target (i.e., the 
trusted computing base) as it executes several functionalities 
such as: rendering controls, visualization, web applications, 
storage, as shown in Fig. 1. The session permissions refer to 
users’ ability to access session resources. The storage deals 
with transit data, which is any data collected in real-time such 
as emotion data or network performance measurements, and 
static data, which refers to user data and progress reports. The 
visualization functionality allows for display of real-time data 
so that the instructor or administrator can view it on a web 
portal. The rendering controls enable the instructor to invite 
students (other users) to join the VR class. A compromise in 
the security of these modules can leak confidential information 
or could compromise the integrity of the entire VRLE system. 
In the following paragraphs, various SPS attacks on server 
components are summarized: 
1) Security: All VRLE systems are open to security attacks 
that can compromise integrity and performance. Session fail- 
ure results from malicious activities carried out by attacker to 
crash VR sessions such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [9]. 
Threats such as Elevation of Privilege (EOP) provide attackers 
elevated access to sessions  and  activities  that  enable  them 
to modify system contents or add malicious files. A typical  
VRLE system collects large amounts of sensitive data, which 
are susceptible to manipulation through data tampering per- 
formed via unauthorized channels. Furthermore, data integrity 
can be compromised by insertion of malicious code to modify 
session entities or data, or even change system configuration or 
access policies. Also, network attacks, such as DoS or DDoS 
result in system crashes and data unavailability. Moreover, 
impersonation attacks can occur when impostors login with 
stolen credentials, and access sensitive user information. 
2) Privacy: Threats to privacy impact VRLE data confiden- 
tiality. Attacks such as eavesdropping allow an attacker to ac- 
cess confidential information via packet sniffing. Also through 
shoulder surfing, attacker can gain access to user authorization 
information through screen or hand movement observation in 
VR sessions. Furthermore, data security breaches including 
tampering with static and transit data allows the attacker to 
gain access to user credentials and real-time data. Informed 
consent is also a concern if users are not notified about what 
data is being collected from them. Improper disposal of data 
can also compromise privacy due to deleted information still 
residing in the server, putting the users confidentiality at risk. 
3) Safety: We consider safety threats to be factors that 
directly impact user well-being. For instance, session takeover 
allows an attacker to control the VR rendering, impacting user 
activity in a VR session. Moreover, any network discrepancy 
initiated by an attacker can cause sudden changes in VR ren- 
dering leading to user disorientation. Unintentional activities 
can also cause safety issues. For example, computer bugs can 
cause glitches within the  VR  rendering  software,  resulting 
in sudden differences in visuals inside the headset. Extended 
sessions can cause cybersickness [15] due to an individual 
being forced to stay in a VR session for an extended period   
of time. 
B. Risk Assessment 
We designed a risk assessment framework to examine 
consequences of undesirable events, predict the likelihood of 
an attack and prioritize the threats accordingly. In subsequent 
paragraphs we formalize our risk assessment framework using 
attack tree formalisms for threat scenarios described above. 
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Fig. 2: Threat model representing formalization and classification of Security, Privacy and Safety threats originating in the 
vSocial VRLE server hosting the virtual reality content. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: A sample security attack tree showing denial of 
service attacks on network and rendering controls. 
 
Attack Trees: They provide a formal, hierarchical structure to 
represent the relationship among possible system vulnerabili- 
ties and their respective attack scenarios. The format of these 
diagrams is the tree structure with ‘target as the root node’  
and the ‘leaf nodes describe the different activities carried out 
by the attacker. For the parent node scenario to be true, it       
is important that the child node logical condition (AND/OR)  
is also true, which is an elegant way to abstract multi-level 
threat impact. An attack tree considers the probabilistic effect 
of a particular event when it is influenced by a combination of 
multiple events. In our work, we apply this concept to threats 
on the vSocial server for analyzing the risk score based on the 
probability of occurrence of any threat event. 
There are several tools to develop attack trees such as 
ADTooL, SecurITree [26], among others which formalize 
attack trees as part of risk assessment. SecurITree specifically 
shows its flexibility by considering several input parameters 
such as: rates, weights, and counter measure nodes at every 
level of the tree. For our proposed risk, we utilize frequency 
rate and duration of attacks. Frequency rates refer to the 
number of times an attack occurs in a specific time period,  
and the duration is the timespan of the attack on the VRLE 
system. Other functionalities such as counter measure node 
could also be considered within a VRLE application setup 
context. 
Risk Assessment for vSocial: Our attack tree for risk 
assessment covers direct and indirect threats that manifest on 
the vSocial server and maps them back to system component 
that was the point of attack origin. The sample tree as shown 
in Fig. 3 is an example for DoS attacks impacting two separate 
system components - network and VR rendering controls. 
Using this sample tree, we can demonstrate the attack impact 
on system security. Propagating up in the tree, either DoS or 
delayed packets can disrupt network security, whereas any 
DoS or packet loss on session availability can cause major 
issues in VR rendering controls. The overall impact is a 
security compromise and hence marked as the root  node.  
With the same logic, sample attack trees are shown for all    
the SPS factors - security in Fig. 4, privacy in Fig. 5 and  
safety in Fig. 6, respectively. The security tree explains how 
attacks on VR space, storage, network, VR rendering controls 
and visualization can impact system robustness. The privacy 
tree exemplifies that loss of user information can happen at 
either storage, VR space or network. The safety tree represents 
that user well-being can be compromised due  to  issues  in 
VR space, VR rendering, location information, network or 
extended sessions. 
The output of the attack tree is the “probability of oc- 
currence,” which is a popular risk metric. Additional metrics 
include distribution of loss or cost of attacks, however they are 
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Fig. 4: Security attack tree showing threats in VR space, storage, network, rendering controls and visualization. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Privacy attack tree showing threats in storage, VR 
space  and network. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: Safety attack tree showing threats on user safety 
concerns. 
 
 
(a) Normal virtual reality rendering with no packet loss 
 
(b) Virtual reality rendering is completely disrupted due 
to packet loss 
Fig. 7: Effect of packet loss on virtual reality rendering. 
 
 
 
 
difficult to measure within a pre-determined time period. The 
probability of occurrence combined with the individual threat 
impact helps us perform the risk assessment by generating   
the risk score for the SPS threats. In other words, this will 
quantify the risk score associated with each of the modules    
in the vSocial server as shown in Figs. 4, 5 and  6.  The  
higher the SPS risk score for  a  particular  threat,  higher is 
the corresponding risk associated with it. Based on these 
values, the VRLE administrator can get better visibility about 
system component vulnerability for a variety of threats and 
subsequently plan defense mitigation strategies for a safer, 
privacy-preserving and a more secure VRLE system. 
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IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we first outline our data collection exper- 
iments that provide insights for our risk score evaluations. 
Following this, we study the importance of system design with 
complete/adhoc quality attack trees towards understanding the 
threat vulnerabilities in a well-defended VRLE system. 
A. System Testbed and Measurement Tools 
The vSocial testbed described in [1] is a cloud-based and 
high-speed network-enabled application hosted on the Global 
Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) cloud rack [27], 
TABLE I: Impact of packet loss on virtual reality learning 
environment with metrics including packet drop percentage 
and average crash time. 
 
Packet Drop Crash Time (secs) Impact 
20% N/A Slow content Rendering 
40% 123 Crash 
60% 36 Crash 
80% 12 Crash 
TABLE II: Upload and Download Speeds in Kbps for 
different bandwidth qualities. 
with  the  VR  content  developed  in  High  Fidelity  [28]. The    
users connect to the virtual classroom via HMD devices such 
as HTC Vive and Oculus Rift. The measurement tools used  
for threat simulations in our testbed are summarized below: 
(1) Steam - Online game platform [29] which also contains  
an inbuilt VR system called steam VR. We utilize its frame 
timing tool to record frame rates in real-time under different 
network conditions. 
(2) Netlimiter - Internet traffic control and monitoring tool  
for network monitoring and tuning in application under study. 
We use it to simulate DoS attacks that create network dis- 
crepancies on our High Fidelity based VRLE application, and 
measure the corresponding frame rate and other impacts on 
VR content rendering. 
(3) Wireshark - A free and open source network protocol 
analyzer used for packet analysis, network troubleshooting and 
monitoring. We use it to capture packets being sent to-and- 
from our High Fidelity based VRLE server to demonstrate 
possible data leaks resulting from the capturing of application 
packets. 
(4) Clumsy 0.2 - A Windows based tool [30] that allows 
controlling network conditions including features such as lag, 
drop, throttle, or tamper of live packets. We specifically utilize 
the drop feature to drop a specific percentage of our packets   
to see the effect on our VRLE application performance. 
B. Test Case Evaluation 
Our experimental attack scenarios include network discrep- 
ancy and packet loss for security, packet sniffing for privacy 
and their impacts on safety. Their real-time measurements are 
provided as inputs in our attack tree to generate a realistic risk 
score. For our work, the duration measurements from packet 
loss were supplied as inputs to the security attack tree as shown 
in Fig. 4. 
1) Security: Using Clumsy 0.2, we changed the percentage 
of packets dropped to measure the time for a complete crash 
of a VRLE environment and recorded its effect on the VRLE 
environment as shown in Table I. The corresponding VR world 
screens with and without the presence of severe packet loss  
are shown in Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b, respectively. 
For network discrepancy, we considered different bandwidth 
qualities - high (normal), medium and low (see Table II) for 
upload and download speed to observe the frame rate and 
High Fidelity content download time. The results summarized 
in Table II show that any upload speed below 30 Kbps resulted 
in High Fidelity crashing. We observed similar impacts on VR 
headset content rendering. Fig. 8a shows the frame rates inside 
High Medium Low 
 
 
Screenshots Fig. 10a Fig. 10b Fig. 10c 
Download Time (secs) 12.2 33.3 >300 
Upload Speed (Kbps) 69 40.04 <30 
Download Speed (Kbps) 134 86 27.66 
 
 
 
 
the headset under high network performance and showcases    
a smooth VR rendering. Fig. 8b displays the same CPU 
performance under a medium network condition, where the 
graph now contains a red coloring as well. This means that  
the frame rate is not really being affected, but that the High 
Fidelity VRLE application is using more than its allotted CPU 
budget. The GPU performance shows similar trends, but has 
not been shown for space constraints. The most drastic case   
in Fig. 8c displays the frame rate under a low bandwidth with 
disruptive fluctuations that makes the experience inside the 
headset undesirably rough and jittery. 
2) Privacy:  In order to simulate packet sniffing attacks,  
we captured a subset of packets being sent to/from our High 
Fidelity VRLE server IP address using Wireshark. From the 
stream for captured packets, we viewed the avatar information 
and confidential host as well as server details as shown in Fig. 
9. This demonstrated that any packet containing confidential 
information about the user or application can be captured and 
deciphered. This becomes a serious risk compromising privacy, 
especially without a secured network protocol. 
3) Safety: For the simulation of safety attacks, we con- 
ducted a usability study introducing threats such as session 
failure and network discrepancy. Through this study, we 
measured the user Quality of Experience (QoE) [31]. It is 
important to note that any security and privacy threats can  
also have safety consequences. For example, reducing the 
bandwidth can cause sudden changes in the VR content, which 
could severely impact the users’ educational experience. A 
normal environment such as Fig. 10a can suddenly lose content 
as shown in Fig. 10b and Fig. 10c. This in turn could highly 
disorient users and increase confusion and frustration levels. 
For our usability study, five participants entered the VRLE 
and their experience was measured under two conditions. They 
represented the two scenarios of control case with no threats 
and security breach. 
Users were given a post simulation questionnaire, where 
they answered 28 questions on a popular psychometric 7- 
point Likert scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree), and 
seven additional open-ended questions further examining their 
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(a) Effect of high bandwidth quality on frame rate. (b) Effect of medium bandwidth quality on frame rate. 
 
(c) Effect of low bandwidth quality on frame rate. 
Fig. 8: Effect of high, medium and low bandwidth quality on frame rate using Frame Timing tool in SteamVR; Effects of 
these conditions on virtual reality rendering are shown in Fig. 10. 
TABLE III: Impact scale of threats on vSocial safety. 
 
Attack Events Scale of Impact 
Redirect Packets to Malicious Server 4 
Poorly Written Code 1 
Location Inference attack 2 
Jitter 3 
Low Bandwidth 4 
Long VR sessions 3 
 
 
Fig. 9: Packet Sniffing using Wireshark showing avatar and 
host server information getting disclosed. 
 
experience. We analyzed the statistically significant differ- 
ences between the two conditions (breach  and  no  breach) 
and displayed the results in Fig. 11 to demonstrate a clear 
difference specifically in dizziness, confusion, control, and 
attitude towards the VRLE. 
This further proves the benefits of conducting risk assess- 
ments by using attack trees and through characterization of 
user experience under security and privacy threat conditions. 
C. Attack Tree Evaluation 
Based on the simulation for packet loss as shown in Table  
I, we used time measurements as duration input values and 
assumed frequencies to generate probabilities of occurrence 
for the security attack tree shown in Fig. 4. We also added 
some intermediary values and obtained the results in Fig. 12, 
and observed a directly proportional relation between duration 
and frequency of attack with the risk score. 
We next present the characteristics required for the formu- 
lation of an effective, complete attack tree. For designing a 
complete attack tree and getting a realistic risk score, it is 
imperative to also consider indirect effects of threats and all 
system components. An adhoc attack tree alternately under- 
represents the system vulnerabilities thus having a reduced  
risk  score.  We   reiterate  our  earlier  observation  that  lower 
 
risk score represents low susceptibility to threats, and hence 
requires less sophisticated defense mechanisms. This seems to 
be operationally simple and also cost effective for a VRLE 
administrator. An adhoc attack  tree  quality,  however,  fails  
to expose the comprehensive attack scenarios giving a false 
impression of a well-defended system or a system that requires 
sophisticated cost-prohibitive defense mechanism. 
For example in vSocial, if someone gains unauthorized 
access to the VRLE administrator or instructor accounts, other 
threats such as data tampering or elevation of privilege (EOP) 
can be triggered as shown in Fig. 4. If indirect implications   
of some threats are not considered in the formalization of the 
attack tree, the complete picture of possible threats will not   
be captured as illustrated in Fig. 3. In the second example,      
if all the threats in storage module are not addressed, then   
the module becomes vulnerable to unaccounted attacks. This 
could result in disclosing confidential user data or session 
information. 
For the characteristic evaluation, attack trees are tested for 
different duration of attacks (d1 = 20 min, d2 = 10 min and d3 
= 5 min), and frequency of attacks (f1 = 5/day, f2 = 3/day and 
f3 = 2/day). Fig. 13 verifies that the SPS risk score increases 
as more threats are addressed. 
The main participants in VRLE system are the students, 
instructor(s), administrator(s) as shown in Fig. 1. Based on the 
threat outcome on the critical system components, recovery 
cost and participants, we have categorized the impact level 
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(a) Normal virtual reality session with 
good bandwidth quality 
(b) Major content loss in virtual 
reality rendering in spite of medium 
bandwidth quality 
(c) Virtual reality rendering is 
completely lost due to bad bandwidth 
quality 
Fig. 10: Effect of high, medium and low bandwidth quality on virtual reality rendering. 
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Fig. 11: Differences in experiences for Breach and No 
Breach scenarios. 
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Fig. 12: Characteristic graphs showing Security Risk Score 
w.r.t. threat behavior including duration (minutes) and rate of 
threat occurrence. 
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Low Low-Med    Medium    Med-High High 
Attack Tree Quality 
High-security High-privacy 
High-safety  Med-security 
   Med-privacy Med-safety 
  Low-security  Low-privacy 
Low-safety 
Fig. 13: Risk Score characteristics based on the variation in 
quality of attack trees for all the SPS trees. 
TABLE IV: Impact scale of threats on vSocial security. 
 
Attack Events Scale of Impact 
XSS attack 4 
Delay Packets 2 
DoS 5 
DDoS 5 
Packet Loss 4 
Instructor Spoofing 2-3 
Admin Spoofing 4-5 
Get Password/Unautherized Login 2-3 
SQL injection 3 
Spoofing 2 
 
with the scale ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). The 
least impact threats with score of 1-2 can be easily repaired, 
whereas threats with significant impact with score of 4-5 
require more time and cost. We assigned the impact level 
scores to each threat for safety in Table III, security in Table 
IV and privacy in Table V. 
Selected results from Table III are shown as concrete 
examples. Redirecting packets to the malicious server can lead 
to session takeover or a change in the student and instructor 
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TABLE V: Impact scale of threats on vSocial privacy. 
 
Attack Events Scale of Impact 
SQL Injection 3 
Undeleted Account 1 
Change Packet Destination 4 
Packet Sniffing 5 
Screen Observation 1  - 2 
Hand Movement Observation 1  - 2 
User not notified 4 
 
 
 
 
VR view(s). Therefore, high impact level of 4 is assigned to 
this attack in Table III. On the other hand, minor programming 
errors or bugs due to poorly written code can cause  only 
minor issues, and hence result in a impact level of 1. Medium 
impact threats are those that are not as severe as redirecting 
packets, but not as mild as poorly written code. Example is 
the occurrence of extended VR sessions, which could result   
in mental fatigue or cybersickness of a student. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we propose a risk assessment framework to 
address the SPS challenges in a VRLE application system.   
We employ formalized attack trees to map threats and as- 
sociated risks to the various system modules to generate a 
corresponding risk score. To show the effectiveness of our 
framework, we introduced three sample attack experiments 
(network discrepancy, packet loss and sniffing) on a realistic 
vSocial testbed. We modified the quality of attack trees (well- 
designed vs. adhoc) based on the number and extent of threats 
being considered. A trade-off analyses between the adhoc and 
well-designed attack trees was performed. We found that - 
although the cost of managing the risk analysis increases, our 
approach provides realistic insights for risks associated with 
the system component vulnerabilities to inform VRLE policy 
management by an administrator to mitigate risks. 
As part of future work, our risk assessment framework can 
be extended to investigate policy change control during VRLE 
sessions for ensuring a secure VR application that protects user 
privacy and ensures user safety. 
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